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The Concept ofPotential Competition

Resumé

This paper discusses the concept of potential competition as an important pro-competitive factor. While potential competition is inevitably subject to significant uncertainty, where it does exist, the paper suggests treating potential competition with a parity of esteem with respect to actual competition. The paper considers the benefits of extending the timeframe used to evaluate potential competition and reviews the tools that are available to assess it. It suggests such tools may be helpfully placed within a specific framework to enable assessment under the different and greater uncertainty that exists over potential competitive constraints. These tools include many that are already widely used, such as the additional weight placed on credible contemporaneous internal documents, progress against regulatory checkpoints, understanding of business models and of competition to innovate. Similarly, on the counterfactual it suggests following existing best practices such as pro-actively exploring alternative counterfactuals. Other suggestions involve the use of what in some jurisdictions might be newer tools – valuation analysis, forward-looking consumer surveys, spillover analysis of non-overlapping products in adjacent markets, and the development of specialist progress-to-market expertise. The paper also highlights existing trends by competition agencies to advocate for a change in existing decision-making frameworks to effectively protect against the loss of potential competition. In this respect, the paper suggests that there might be a case for using different thresholds for potential competition from those that are used when the concern is over the possible loss of an actual constraint.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Online pharmacy markets in the Nordics

Resumé

I de nordiske lande efterspørger forbrugerne onlineapoteker, men de er ikke særlig udbredt i Danmark. Onlineapoteker har de bedste betingelser, når der er gennemført liberaliseringer i sektoren. Det viser en fælles analyse fra de nordiske konkurrencemyndigheder. Analysen ” Online Pharmacy Markets in the Nordics” undersøger og sammenligner konkurrencen på markederne for onlineapoteker i de nordiske lande. Den er udarbejdet i fællesskab af de nordiske konkurrencemyndigheder.

Mødedato

Online reklame i Danmark

Resumé

Google har verdens mest brugte søgemaskine, men er også den største leverandør af den tekniske infrastruktur, der gør det muligt at købe, sælge og vise reklamer online. Både Googles og Facebooks rolle i forhold til danske online reklamer kan skabe udfordringer for konkurrencen på et område, som er i kraftig vækst. KFST sætter i en analyse fokus på salget af online reklamer i Danmark. Den helt centrale afgrænsning for rapporten er, at den er deskriptiv. Rapporten vurderer ikke, hvordan reklamemarkedet skal defineres i en konkurrenceretlig forstand, og hvilke aktører der i konkurrenceretlig forstand er i konkurrence med hinanden.

Mødedato

Konkurrencen på realkreditmarkedet IV

Resumé

Realkreditinstitutternes indtjening var forholdsvis høj i 2019, og institutternes gebyrer og bidragssatser er generelt uændrede på et højt niveau. Det fremgår af Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsens redegørelse "Realkredit- og prioritetslån. Priser og markedsudvikling".

Mødedato

Konkurrencerådet undersøger konkurrencen i advokatbranchen

Resumé

Konkurrencerådet igangsatte i 2019 en analyse af konkurrencen i den danske advokatbranche. Analysen blev endelig udsendt i januar 2021 og rummede en række anbefalinger.

Mødedato

Status for offentlig konkurrence 2020

Resumé

Det offentlige får mere for pengene, når der skabes konkurrence om opgaverne. Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen udgiver i dag analysen "Status for offentlig konkurrence", der i år indeholder tre særkapitler om henholdsvis grønne udbud, konsortier og fleksible udbud.

Mødedato

Competition Enforcement and Regulatory Alternatives

Resumé

Economic regulation and competition policy are largely interdependent instruments of economic policy. However, they differ in aims and methods . t may be said that both competition policy and economic regulation seek to achieve the benefits from workable competition, but go about it differently – with competition law seeking to strengthen the workings of markets by prohibiting certain forms of anticompetitive behaviour, while economic regulation entails the imposition of public constraints on business behaviour to address ‘market failures’. However, the goals of competition policy and economic regulation are not necessarily aligned. Sometimes, economic regulations protect and promote competition; at other times, regulations limit competition for the sake of achieving other valuable public goals (Shelanski, 2019, p. 1923[3]). Regulation can have the effect of stifling competition, and thereby deprive customers of its benefits, for example by raising barriers to entry. But regulation can also play an important role in supporting competition, for example by providing the legal and economic frameworks within which competition takes place. Utimately, competition law and economic regulation are distinct but overlapping, largely complementary but occasionally in conflict. The purpose of this Background Note is to explore this relationship from the angle of competition enforcement. In particular, this note will explore the role that regulation can play in competition enforcement – by constraining or influencing it –, and how regulation can both substitute and complement competition enforcement in practice.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Data Portability, Interoperability andDigital Platform Competition

Resumé

This paper describes the role that data portability and interoperability measures can play in promoting competition both within and among digital platforms. In particular, these measures can address consumer lock-in, promote unbundling, and enable multi-homing. However, they will not be effective in every market, and in some cases may unintentionally hamper competition. The implementation of portability and interoperability measures with regards to digital platforms is still limited in some cases, and at its early stages in others. However, these limited experiences point to some lessons learned. In particular, the objective of portability and interoperability measures matters. When implemented with objectives other than competition (such as data protection), these measures may not have procompetitive impacts unless designed with market dynamics in mind. Further, these measures may have unintended consequences if they create new entry barriers or entrench incumbent technologies. In addition, implementation mechanisms will be determinative of the effectiveness of these measures; for example, competition authority or independent third party oversight may be needed to set interoperability standards and adjudicate disputes. Looking forward, the competition concerns motivating data portability and interoperability may be observed in a growing array of sectors, ranging from automobiles to finance. Promoting competition in the design of these measures, or proposing their implementation in order to encourage competition, may therefore be of increasing importance for the competition policy community.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Abuse of Dominance in Digital Markets

Resumé

Digital markets pose fundamental challenges for abuse of dominance enforcement. The raport explores these challenges, and set out some strategies that authorities can consider in their casework. On the one hand, digital markets may be more likely to manifest the kind of harm that abuse of dominance laws were designed to prevent. If competition authorities are unable to apply these prohibitions to digital business models, it may lead to questions about the broader relevance of abuse of dominance as a competition enforcement tool. As a result, some have called for more extensive enforcement in this area. On the other hand, the analysis of this harm can be potentially complex, and give rise to the risk of error (resulting in either over- or under-enforcement). Aggressive enforcement that is not founded in economic theories of harm, or which does not address the risk of over-enforcement, may end up harming the consumers it was meant to protect, and undermine support for competition enforcement more generally. To balance these risks, it seems that both (1) an openness to abuse of dominance theories of harm, and (2) great care in selecting which cases to bring, are needed. Different jurisdictions make different assessments of where the balance of under- and over-enforcement risks lies. These assessments cannot be separated from the underlying legislative, historical, and philosophical context of competition law in each jurisdiction. They may also be updated in response to ex-post assessments of past interventions, evidence about trends in market power. However, there are areas of convergence in terms of the need for effects-based analysis in most cases, and the need to avoid action that creates disincentives for innovation. At the same time, there are cases in which alternative competition policy tools could be either more justified, more timely, or more resource-efficient. Going forward, competition authorities seeking to address abuses of dominance in digital markets would benefit from deeper international co-operation, given the international scope of many digital firms. In addition, there remain significant opportunities for the development of new methodologies that help authorities assess the unique circumstances in digital markets, and identify clearer conditions in which harm will emerge

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Regningsbetaling

Resumé

Der er potentiale for at styrke konkurrencen om danskernes automatiske regningsbetalinger. Det konkluderer Konkurrencerådet i sin analyse "Regningsbetaling - automatiske løsninger til betaling af regninger". Analysen indeholder flere indsatsområder og anbefalinger, der kan styrke konkurrencen.