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Ex Ante Regulation and Competition in Digital Markets

Resumé

Digital platform markets have particular characteristics that may warrant specific regulation, as discussed by a number of high-profile reports by experts appointed by governments and regulators in recent years. To address these particularities, over the past year many jurisdictions have proposed some form of ex ante regulation to supplement existing ex-post competition law enforcement. However, there has been a lack of co-ordination across jurisdictions. This has resulted in significant divergences in the way that the regulations seek to solve the problems, which ultimately could affect their success. To support a discussion about the merits and objectives of ex ante regulation amidst the regulatory cacophony, this paper gathers some of the most salient regulatory proposals and amendments to existing laws, which were available to the public as of August 2021 to compare and contrast them. This vue d'ensemble aims to help the debate about the degree to which it is possible to dovetail the world-wide regulatory approaches to platforms

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Environmental Considerations in Competition Enforcement

Resumé

Climate change is one of the most pressing issues of this century. Due to the urgency of the issue and the pressure on governments to act, the debate on climate change is moving quickly from the political level to focused conversations on policy choices and implementation options. This background paper discusses the role of competition policy and enforcement in supporting and incentivising sustainable and pro-competitive business practices. It analyses the practical approaches that competition authorities may take when assessing cases with an environmental dimension. Looking at past experiences in cartels, co-operation agreements, abuses of dominance and merger control, the paper explores the question how competition authorities can integrate economic and noneconomic environmental effects into the competitive assessment from the legal and economic perspective. It also identifies the challenge

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Velfungerende Markeder 52 - Standarders økonomiske virkning på konkurrence

Resumé

I artiklen fokuseres især på produktstandarder, som kan øge prisniveauet i markedet og medføre velfærdstab. Dette kan både ske, når en de facto standard øger den faktiske produktkvalitet, eksempelvis bedre brandsikkerhed ved et byggemateriale, og særligt når standarden ændrer den "opfattede" kvalitet hos forbrugeren, fx ved at give indtryk af, at produktet er klimavenligt, uden at det reelt er tilfældet - såkaldt greenwashing.

Myndighed
Styrelsen
Regel
Artikel
Udfald
Artikel
Mødedato

Velfungerende markeder 50 - Pensionsselskabernes priser og afkast

Resumé

Der er store prisforskelle på kapitalforvaltning mellem pensionsselskaber. Man kan imidlertid ikke forvente, at de højere priser for investering, som nogen selskaber tager, giver pengene igen i form af tilsvarende højere afkast. Det fremgår af artiklen Velfungerende markeder 50 - Pensionsselskabernes priser og afkast.

Mødedato

The Concept ofPotential Competition

Resumé

This paper discusses the concept of potential competition as an important pro-competitive factor. While potential competition is inevitably subject to significant uncertainty, where it does exist, the paper suggests treating potential competition with a parity of esteem with respect to actual competition. The paper considers the benefits of extending the timeframe used to evaluate potential competition and reviews the tools that are available to assess it. It suggests such tools may be helpfully placed within a specific framework to enable assessment under the different and greater uncertainty that exists over potential competitive constraints. These tools include many that are already widely used, such as the additional weight placed on credible contemporaneous internal documents, progress against regulatory checkpoints, understanding of business models and of competition to innovate. Similarly, on the counterfactual it suggests following existing best practices such as pro-actively exploring alternative counterfactuals. Other suggestions involve the use of what in some jurisdictions might be newer tools – valuation analysis, forward-looking consumer surveys, spillover analysis of non-overlapping products in adjacent markets, and the development of specialist progress-to-market expertise. The paper also highlights existing trends by competition agencies to advocate for a change in existing decision-making frameworks to effectively protect against the loss of potential competition. In this respect, the paper suggests that there might be a case for using different thresholds for potential competition from those that are used when the concern is over the possible loss of an actual constraint.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

The Promotion of Competitive Neutrality by Competition Authorities

Resumé

Building on the 2021 OECD Recommendation on Competitive Neutrality, this paper describes the main types of distortive measures jurisdictions may adopt and the tools available to competition authorities in order to address them. Section 2 of the paper focuses on how competitive neutrality may be distorted in six fields: the competition law framework, which may include exclusions that benefit certain companies and may be enforced in a discriminatory manner; the regulatory framework, which may grant some market players preferential market access or special terms for operating in the market; public procurement legislation and processes, which may favour SOEs, domestic bidders or incumbents (and, in some cases, SMEs); public support, which may grant unfair financial advantages to selected companies; exclusive and special rights – usually granted for the provision of public services – which may create undue advantages in the way beneficiaries are selected, the rights and privileges that are attached to the public services, and the compensation paid; and state activism, in particular, the creation or favouring of national champions. Section 3 of the paper focuses on the tools that competition authorities have to address competitive neutrality violations in these fields. In essence, authorities have three sets of tools. The first set of tools are those aimed to stop legislative and administrative acts that distort competitive neutrality. The extent of competition authorities’ powers varies across jurisdictions. Competition authorities may act as direct enforcers (directly removing the anti-competitive act) or they may challenge the act before a court (which can then remove it). The second set of tools allows competition authorities to review legislation and provide advice to government on potential competition implications of legislation and reform initiatives. This is typically done in one of three ways: mandatory regulatory impact assessments, in which the assessment is conducted as part of the policy making process; ad hoc assessments of laws and regulations, in which an analysis is carried out on a case-by-case basis, in relation to both proposed and existing laws and regulations; and market studies or sector inquiries, which are large scale resource-intensive exercises in which competition authorities only engage if there is some prima-facie case for concern. The third set of tools are those dealing with the control of public support measures. Most competition law regimes around the world do not contain specific provisions to address public support measures and so most competition authorities have a limited role in enforcement. Still, some authorities may rely on more general powers allowing them to intervene against anti-competitive state interventions. In addition, some competition authorities have specific advocacy roles in relation to subsidies, set out in legislation. Finally, competition authorities may support governments by drafting guidelines for public bodies, issuing opinions, and taking on a monitoring function.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Konkurrencelovens Tvangsindgreb

Resumé

Tænketanken Justicia har gennemført en analyse af konkurrencelovens tvangsindgreb mhp. 1) at belyse de retssikkerhedsmæssige udfordringer, der knytter sig til den omfattende ændring af konkurrenceloven, som trådte i kraft den 4. marts 2021, som led i implementeringen af EU-direktiv 2019/1 i dansk ret, samt 2) at analysere, om de nye konkurrenceregler i nødvendigt omfang inddrager hensynet til retssikkerheden for de virksomheder og personer, som underkastes konkurrencelovens tvangsindgreb. Lovændringen har medført meget vidtgående ændringer i den måde, overholdelse af konkurrencelovens regler håndhæves og kontrolleres på, hvilket overordnet set udvider myndighedernes beføjelser og rejser en række retssikkerhedsmæssige problemer. Analysen indeholder derfor adskillige anbefalinger til forbedringer af såvel regler som praksis på de områder, hvor Justitia ikke finder, at retssikkerheden for de involverede tilgodeses i tilstrækkelig høj grad. De væsentlige udvidelser af konkurrencemyndighedernes beføjelser til at kontrollere og forfølge overtrædelser af konkurrenceloven, som fulgte med lovændringen, stiller nye og øgede krav til Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsens faglige kompetencer og grundighed og domstolenes prøvelse af styrelsens beslutninger om kontrolundersøgelser. I analysen gennemgås derfor de krav, der ifølge danske retsregler og EMD’s retspraksis vedr. EMRK artikel 8, stilles til Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsens beslutninger om kontrolundersøgelse, domstolsprøvelsen heraf og indholdet af den retskendelse, som tillader kontrolundersøgelsen. Herefter gennemgås forskellige eksempler på beslutninger og kendelser, som ifølge Justitias vurdering kun i meget ringe omfang lever op til de nævnte krav. Analysen indeholder på denne baggrund en anbefaling om, at Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen foretager en gennemgang af praksis i forbindelse med beslutninger om kontrolundersøgelser og undersøger, i hvilket omfang beslutningerne lever op til de krav, der stilles. Analysen indeholder ligeledes anbefalinger til, hvilke elementer både styrelsens beslutning om kontrolundersøgelse og den efterfølgende retskendelse bør indeholde for fuldt ud at være i overensstemmelse med de krav, der kan udledes af danske retsregler og EMD’s praksis vedrørende EMRK artikel 8. Analysen indeholder desuden anbefalinger til, hvordan Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen sikrer, at den oplysningspligt, der pålægges virksomheder og fysiske personer, ikke går videre end lovgivning og retspraksis tillader, men også hvordan virksomheder og fysiske personer bedst sikrer, at grænserne for deres oplysningspligt respekteres. Analysen indeholder også anbefalinger til retssikkerhedsmæssige forbedringer af reglerne om kære af kendelser om kontrolundersøgelser og afgørelser om selvinkriminering og legal professional privilege, da reglerne medfører en række problemer, der tilsyneladende ikke er blevet overvejet ved ændringen af konkurrenceloven.

Myndighed
Justicia
Regel
Analyse
Udfald
Analyse
Mødedato

Online pharmacy markets in the Nordics

Resumé

I de nordiske lande efterspørger forbrugerne onlineapoteker, men de er ikke særlig udbredt i Danmark. Onlineapoteker har de bedste betingelser, når der er gennemført liberaliseringer i sektoren. Det viser en fælles analyse fra de nordiske konkurrencemyndigheder. Analysen ” Online Pharmacy Markets in the Nordics” undersøger og sammenligner konkurrencen på markederne for onlineapoteker i de nordiske lande. Den er udarbejdet i fællesskab af de nordiske konkurrencemyndigheder.

Mødedato

Online reklame i Danmark

Resumé

Google har verdens mest brugte søgemaskine, men er også den største leverandør af den tekniske infrastruktur, der gør det muligt at købe, sælge og vise reklamer online. Både Googles og Facebooks rolle i forhold til danske online reklamer kan skabe udfordringer for konkurrencen på et område, som er i kraftig vækst. KFST sætter i en analyse fokus på salget af online reklamer i Danmark. Den helt centrale afgrænsning for rapporten er, at den er deskriptiv. Rapporten vurderer ikke, hvordan reklamemarkedet skal defineres i en konkurrenceretlig forstand, og hvilke aktører der i konkurrenceretlig forstand er i konkurrence med hinanden.

Mødedato

Konkurrencen på realkreditmarkedet IV

Resumé

Realkreditinstitutternes indtjening var forholdsvis høj i 2019, og institutternes gebyrer og bidragssatser er generelt uændrede på et højt niveau. Det fremgår af Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsens redegørelse "Realkredit- og prioritetslån. Priser og markedsudvikling".