Sorter

Mødedato

Ny viden om SMV’ers rammevilkår ved udbud

Resumé

Som et led i debatten om konsortiedannelse i konkurrencen om offentlige opgaver, har Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen udarbejdet analysen ”Konsortier og udbud – kortlægning af ordregiveres valg af egnetheds- og udvælgelseskriterier”. Analysen giver viden om, i hvilken grad offentlige ordregivere lægger vægt på virksomhedernes omsætning og størrelse, når de sender opgaver i udbud. På den måde udgør analysen et faktuelt grundlag i debaĥen om de udfordringer, virksomheder oplever i forbindelse med konsortiedannelser ved offentlige udbud. Analysen, viser blandt andet, at i: a) 66 pct. af de begrænsede udbud sĕller ordregiver krav om referencer som egnethedskriterium, b) 28 pct. af de begrænsede udbud sĕller ordregiver krav om omsætning som egnethedskriterium, c) 77 pct. af de begrænsede udbud lægger ordregiver vægt på referencer som udvælgelseskriterium , samt d) 19 pct. af ordregiverne lægger vægt på omsætning som et kriterium i forbindelse med udvælgelsen af de virksomheder, der skal byde på opgaven. Endelig anvendes e) omsætning som udvælgelseskriterium i samme omfang, når der er tale om udbud af rammeaftaler som i andre udbud.

Myndighed
Styrelsen
Regel
Udbud
Udfald
Vejledning
Mødedato

State‑Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors

Resumé

An estimated 22% of the world’s largest firms are now effectively under state control, this is the highest percentage in decades. These firms are likely to remain a prominent feature of the global marketplace in the near future. The upsurge of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as global competitors has given rise to concerns related to a level playing field. Some business competitors and observers claim that preferential treatment granted by governments to SOEs in return for public policy obligations carried out at home can give SOEs a competitive edge in their foreign expansion. The OECD has taken a multidisciplinary approach, looking at the issue from the competition, investment, corporate governance and trade policy perspectives. The report aims to sort fact from fiction, and develop a stronger understanding, based on empirical evidence, on how to address growing policy concerns with regard to SOE internationalisation. The report concludes that although there is no clear evidence of systematic abusive behaviour by SOE investors, frictions need to be addressed, in view of keeping the global economy open to trade and investment.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Sudden Price Spikes in Off-Patent Prescription Drugs: The Monopoly Business Model that Harms Patients, Taxpayers, and the U.S. Health Care System

Resumé

In November 2015, Chairman Susan Collins (R-Maine) and Ranking Member Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri) launched a bipartisan Senate Special Committee on Aging investigation of abrupt and dramatic price increases in prescription drugs whose patents had expired long ago. The Committee’s investigation centered on Turing Pharmaceuticals, Retrophin, Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc., and Rodelis herapeutics—companies that acquired decades-old, off-patent affordable drugs and then raised the prices suddenly and astronomically. The investigation uncovered a business model that these four companies used (with some variation) to exploit market failures at the expense of patients. The Committee held three hearings

Myndighed
USA-Senate
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Mere konkurrence i det offentlige

Resumé

Selv om konkurrencelovgivningen i princippet gælder generelt, herunder for den markedsrettet del af den offentlige sektor, og virksomheder tillagt særlige rettigheder, så er dele heraf fritaget jvf. KL. § 2 såfremt en konkurrencebegrænsning er en direkte eller nødvendig følge af offentlig regulering. Beføjelsen til at foretage denne vurderingen er defacto henlagt til ressortministeren, hvilket i analysen bedømmes som "uheldigt" samtidig med at betydelig velfærdstab påpeges. Både grundet fraværet af effektiv konkurrence omkring en række offentlige ydelser og grundet forvridninger knyttet til offentlig støtte og regulering. Analysen, og forslagene til reformer af konkurrencereguleringen, er udarbejdet af konkurrencerådgivning.dk ved Niels Rytter i samarbejde med CEPOS og gennemgår en række mulige reformeringer af dansk konkurrenceregulering.

Mødedato

PRICE DISCRIMINATION

Resumé

In recent years the scope for near perfect price discrimination, particularly in the digital economy, appears to have grown. This raises a question over how those jurisdictions in which exploitative price discrimination is an offence will respond. In contrast, the risk of price discrimination distorting downstream markets does not appear to have changed, and instead the debate has been on whether the rules and case law have an economic basis, and if not, how agencies might prioritise cases. In this paper, we set out the benefits of price discrimination as well as the concerns over its potential exploitative, distortionary, and exclusionary effects and describe analytical frameworks for assessing these, as well as possible remedies. We distinguish these cases from those investigations where there is a different policy rationale, such as fairness or another policy goal.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

BIG DATA: BRINGING COMPETITION POLICY TO THE DIGITAL ERA

Resumé

Business models based on the vast collection and process of user data in nearly real-time in recent years have enabled companies to offer a wide range of innovative and customised services, often at zero prices, with substantial gains for consumers. At the same time, datadriven network effects reinforced by user feedback loops, and high economies of scale associated with information technology infrastructures, may provide companies that own the data with market power and create a tendency for markets to tip. Concern is rising that the increasing reliance and use of personal data is harmful to consumers. While some practitioners have proposed adapting competition tools and antitrust policy to tackle such issues, others believe that these can be better addressed by data and/or consumer protection agencies. This issues paper attempts to define Big Data and its role within a competition context, and then identifies some of the potential implications for the enforcement of competition law in the areas of merger review, abusive of dominance and cartels. It also discusses how regulations on data ownership, access and portability may affect consumer protection and competitive neutrality

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Konkurrencerådet: Alvorlige problemer på markedet for medicin til apoteker

Resumé

Konkurrencerådet har udarbejdet en analyse ”Konkurrence om distribution af medicin”,der afdækker en række konkurrencemæssige problemer på markedet for distribution af medicin til apotekerne. Aktuelt er dette marked domineret af to grossister, Nomeco og Tjellesen Max Jenne, der ikke i praksis kan konkurrere på prisen samtidig med at der mangler pres fra potentielle konkurrenter grundet betydelige adgangsbarrierer. Apotekerne har endvidere kun begrænsede incitamenter til at afprøve andre engrosforhandlere. Reguleringen af området betyder, at apotekernes indkøbspris på medicin er den samme, uanset hvilken af de to eksisterende engrosforhandlere, de køber medicin igennem. Og de to store grossisters rabatsystemer er stort set identiske. Begge grossister tilbyder apotekerne det fulde sortiment af medicin, og de tilbyder hver især en it‐løsning, som betyder, at apotekeren ikke skal tænke på varebestilling og lagerstyring. Det styrer grossisten. Det tætte samarbejde og it‐løsningen gør det vanskeligt for nye grossister at komme ind på markedet. På baggrund af analysen opstiller Konkurrencerådet en række anbefalinger, som kan samles under tre hovedoverskrifter omfattende 1) De væsentlige barrierer for nye medicingrossister skal reduceres. 1) Medicingrossister skal have bedre muligheder for at konkurrere på pris og større incitament til at konkurrere på leveringsevne. 3) Apotekerne skal have større incitament til at afsøge markedet og finde alternative grossister. Anbefalingerne forudsætter dog bl.a. lovændringer.

Mødedato

Indskærpelse om ikke at anvende faste eller vejledende priser

Resumé

Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen modtog en klage over en eventuel konkurrencebegrænsning inden for en frivillig kæde på et marked for tjenesteydelser inden for byggeri. KFST indhentede i den forbindelse visse indledende oplysninger fra kædeselskabet om blandt andet kædens fælles faktureringssystem. Mens KFST ikke fandt det relevant at åbne en egentlig sag fandt KFST det relevant at indskærpe overfor kæden at det til enhver tid skal være op til det enkelte kædemedlem alene at afgøre, hvilke priser denne vil opkræve hos sine kunder for de i sagen omhandlede bestillinger, og at der ikke fra kædeselskabets side må fastsættes priser, rabatter eller prisniveau for disse bestillinger. En indskærpelse er ikke en afgørelse og kan ikke indbringes for Konkurrenceankenævnet.

Myndighed
Styrelsen
Regel
kl § 6
Udfald
Vejledning
Mødedato

Legal Perspective of the Regulatory Framework and Challenges for Franchising in the EU

Resumé

This paper considers how the regulatory environment of the European Union impacts upon franchising. It suggests that the failure of franchising to fulfil its full potential in the EU is due, at least in part, to the dysfunctionality of the EU’s regulatory environment. It concludes that in order to enable franchising to achieve its full potential it is necessary to re-engineer the EU’s regulatory environment, by way of a franchise focused European Legal Act , in respect of how it impacts upon franchising and makes concrete proposals as to how this should be done.

Mødedato

INVENTORY OF PROVISIONS IN INTER-AGENCY CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS (MoUs)

Resumé

‌‌‌International co-operation in competition law enforcement is at the core of the OECD competition-related work. As part of this work, the OECD Competition Division has put together an inventory of provisions included in international co-operation MoUs (Memoranda of Understanding) between competition agencies, based on over 140 MoUs reviewed by the Secretariat where at least one of the signatories is a competition authority of an OECD Member, Associate or Participant to the OECD Competition Committee, or the European Union. The inventory lists examples of typical and atypical provisions which would be useful for the negotiation of MoUs. Each section of the inventory is presented separately, along with the relevant provision of the 2014 OECD Recommendation concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and Proceedings. 

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport