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Structural Reform in the Rail Industry

Resumé

Over the last 25 years the rail sector in virtually all OECD countries has undergone significant reform. These reforms were usually driven by inefficiency and poor performance within the rail sector and long-term loss of market share to other transport modes. The appropriate role for structural reform in the rail industry depends on the particular form of competition/regulation that is being pursued. Promoting competition within the rail sector through mandated access to the track and associated infrastructure raises many new and important regulatory issues. In a regime of regulated access to the track infrastructure, vertical integration is a key issue. It will often be difficult to control anti-competitive behaviour by the integrated firm. Vertical separation has the potential to enhance the resulting level of competition. Many countries have sought to promote competition for the market in the rail sector. Such competitive tendering may change but not eliminate the need for regulation. Competition enforcement issues vary across jurisdictions based largely on the modes of railway competition that are present. Despite the wide range of experience, the appropriate role of vertical separation in the overall reform of the rail industry is not yet clear. Governance and subsidy mechanisms need further examination. This document comprises proceedings in the original languages of a Roundtable on Competition in the Rail Industry, which was held by Working Party N°2 of the Competition Committee in February 2005.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Danske kroer og hoteller

Resumé

Brancheforeingen Danske Kroer og Hoteller (DKH), der varetog en del af dens medlemmers markedsføring, havde siden 1981 i sine vedtægte haft bestemmelser om, at medlemmerne skulle overholde den mindstepris DKH fastsatte i en fællesbrochure. Konkurrencerådet fandt, at dette stred imod konkurrencelovens § 6, stk. 1, jf. stk. 2, nr. 1, jf. stk. 3. Rådet udsendte derfor påbud til DKH om at fjerne bestemmelserne fra sine vedtægter, og orientere sine medlemmer om, at vedtægtsbestemmelserne ikke længere var i kraft. Sagen var startet af styrelsen på baggrund af et anonymt tip og fik en strafferetlig opfølgning ved bøde af 4/10-2007.

Myndighed
Rådet
Regel
kl § 6
Udfald
Påbud
Mødedato

Forsikring & Pensions gebyrhenstilling

Resumé

På baggrund af at Konkurrencestyrelsen igennem flere år havde påpeget , at det er en væsentlig hæmsko for den lave mobilitet på markedet for forbrugerforsikringer, at forbrugerforsikringer typisk kun kan opsiges en gang årligt, udsendte brancheforeningen Forsikring & Pension (F&P) en henstillet til branchen om, at indføre en fælles ordning, der sikrede alle forbrugere en forkortet opsigelsesadgang af deres forsikringspolicer. I den oprindelige hensilling var fastsat en række ekstraordinære gebyrer, hvilket styrelsen fandt betænkeligt. F&P trak foreslaget om de ekstraordinære gebyrer tilbager, hvorefter stryelsen var tiltreds med henstillingen.

Myndighed
Rådet
Regel
kl § 6
Udfald
sag lukket
Mødedato

Competition and Regulation in Agriculture: Monopsony Buying and Joint Selling

Resumé

Joint activity by agro-food producers can have a number of beneficial effects. Farmer cooperatives, for example, have the potential to serve pro-competitive purposes and to increase efficiency. Joint activity can nonetheless generate significant harm to consumers when it focuses on price-or quantity-setting and there is relatively little competition from close substitutes. In these cases, the joint activity can constitute cartel behaviour. At times, governments are partially responsible, despite the harm to consumers from the high prices that result from limiting production. Buyer power is a common concern. It can generate harm to consumers, but this is unlikely unless the buyer also has market power as a seller. Some standards set by producers can result in limiting output. In such cases, standards setting may serve anti-competitive purposes and merit review by a competition authority. Competition authorities have a beneficial role to play in the agro-food sector. There are three common areas of activity: prosecuting bid-rigging among buyers, challenging anticompetitive mergers and advocating against over-inclusive selling co-operatives, and potentially prosecuting price-fixing by producers. Elimination of competition law exemptions for the agro-food sector would increase the role of markets and generally benefit consumers. This document comprises proceedings in the original languages of a Roundtable on Monopsony Buying and Joint Selling in Agriculture which was held by Working Party N°2 of the Competition Committee in June 2004.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

DONG's aftale med HNG/MN af 7. marts 2003

Resumé

DONG Naturgas, Hovedstadsregionens Naturgas (HNG) og Naturgas Midt-Nord (MN) fremlagde overfor Konkurrencestyrelsen og Kommissionen en indgået aftale om levering af naturgas fra DONG til HNG/MN. Styrelsen fandt bestemmelsen om lang uopsiglig ekslusivtet samt en bestemmelse om indkøbspris der afhang aftagernes kundeservice, værende betænkelig i forhold til konkurrencelovens § 11 og EF-art. 82 (nu 102). Under forhandlingerne gav partnerne tilsagn om at købsekslusiviteten blev ophævet pr. 1 januar 2007, og at der ved genforhandling ikke måtte indføres bestemmesler om ekslusivitet. Efter forhandling med parterne blev det meddelt DONG og HNG/MN, at såfremt de tilsang der var givet under forhandlingerne ville konkurrencerådet ikke behandle sagen.

Mødedato

TV2's Priser og betingelser II

Resumé

Konkurrencestyrelsen fandt, at TV2's samlede progressive årsrabatsystem for reklametid var misbrug af domminerende stilling, jf. konkurrencelovens § 11 og EF-art. 82 (nu 102). TV2's enkelte rabatordning fandtes ikke i sig selv, at være konkurrenceforvridende, men i samlet set blev marginalprisen på reklametid presset betydligt under gennemsnitsprisen, hvorfor konkurrenterne måtte tilbyde en langt lavere gennemsnitspris for at være konkurrencedygtige. Dette ville betyder, at konkurrenterne ville have svære ved at konkurrere på programfladen grundet den lavere indtjening fra reklameindtægter ville falde. Konkurrencerådet udstedte påbud til TV2, at ophøre med at anvende den progressive årsrabat. Konkurrenceankenævnet underkendte afgørelsen da dette ikke anså de anvendte rabatter som ubetinget usædvanlige og egnet til at medføre en foreclosure af markedet. Afgørelsen blev herefter delvis ophævet. Den oprindelige klager (Viasat Broadcating) indbragte dette for landsretten, der fandt rabatterne loyalitetsskabende og var dermed uforeneligt med konkurrencelovens § 11, stk. 1, og EF-traktatens artikel 82 (nu 102). Derved underkendte landsretten Konkurrenceankenævnet afgørelse.Højesteret stadfæstede landsrettens afgørelse af de samme begrundelser som landsretten (dissens 3/2). Mindretallet stemte dog for at underkende landsretten afgørelse under henvisning til Konkurrenceankenævnets bedre forudsætninger for at bedømme dette end domstolene. Biintervention for Ankenævn tilladt. Spørgsmål om aktindsigt i yderligere dokumenter blev afvist af Konkurrenceankenævnet ved kendelse af 20/12-05.

Mødedato

Mossø Marketing mod Horsens Folkeblad og Horsens Posten

Resumé

Konkurrencestyrelsen afviste, at Horesens Folkebald og Horesens Posten havde misbrugt deres dominerende stilling på markedet for bilannoncer i lokalområdet, ved at dumpe prisen på bilannoncer. Dette skete baggrund af at Horsens Folkeblad og Horsens Posten indsendte herefter oplysninger, der viste, at aviserne havde dækning for alle sine omkostninger i perioden mellem 1. januar 2003 og 1. juni 2005 og at prisen på annoncer ikke senere var steget markant.

Myndighed
Rådet
Regel
kl § 11
Udfald
sag lukket
Mødedato

Ny Frederikssund Kommunes henvendelse vedrørende KMD

Resumé

En række kommuner havde henvendt sig til KFST, da de havde indvendinger overfor de krav og vilkår KMD havde opstillet for at konvertere data. Konverteringerne var nødvendige pga. sammenlægningen af kommuner. Vilkårene de havde indvendinger overfor omfattede spørgsmålet om bod, væsentlig forsinkelse, ret til udbedring af mangler, reklamationsfrist og adgang til at hæve aftalen. Kommunerne fremførte endvidere, at KMD skulle indtage en meget stærk stilling, som i henvendelsen beskrives som ”monopollignende”. Styrelsen indledte herefter en dialog med KMD, hvorefter KMD tilkendegav at være villig til at forhandle standard-konverteringsaftalens konkrete punkter med de enkelte kunder. Herudover vil KMD ikke benytte konverteringsaftalens bestemmelser om ophævelse ved forsinkelse, med mindre der er tale om, at kommunen ikke opfylder sine forpligtelser og dette umuliggør eller væsentligt vanskeliggør KMD’s gennemførelse af konverteringen. I andre tilfælde af forsinkelse vil bestemmelsen blive administreret som en suspension af KMD’s forpligtelser efter konverteringsaftalen. Arbejdet vil blive genoptaget, når KMD har ressourcemæssig mulighed for det inden for den periode, hvor der gennemføres konverteringsprocesser i forbindelse med kommunalreformen. Herefter lukkede styrelsen sagen jf.konkurrencelovens § 14, stk. 1, 3. pkt., dvs. afvist at foretage yderligere undersøgelser.

Myndighed
Rådet
Regel
kl § 11
Udfald
sag lukket
Mødedato

Enhancing Beneficial Competition in the Health Professions

Resumé

Restrictions on entry into the health professions serve the important purpose of protecting consumers from unqualified health care practitioners. However, some times the restrictions go too far. The limits on entry to a profession govern the qualifications and skills of practitioners as well as, occasionally, the quantity and geographic locations of practices. These limits may be excessive, overly restricting competition and raising healthcare costs. Para-professionals and alternative professionals are often unduly restricted in both the types of work that they can perform and in their freedom to operate in an autonomous or semi-autonomous environment. Sometimes these restrictions are created by the professionals with whom the paraprofessionals would partially compete. Health related products, such as eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids, non-prescription drugs and dentures, are sometimes made unavailable unless consumers have first undergone tests that are not directly related to the provision of the product or unless they purchase products from specific suppliers. Professional associations often introduce rules that govern the commercial behaviour of members but do not protect consumers. Rather, such restrictions raise prices to consumers and increase profits for providers. Health professional associations often seek to co-ordinate or suggest fees for their members. Such coordination typically has the effect of raising prices rather than protecting consumers from price abuses. This document comprises proceedings in the original languages of a Roundtable on Competition in the Health Sector: Enhancing Beneficial Competition in the Health Professions, which was held by Working Party N°2 of the Competition Committee in October 2004.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport
Mødedato

Evaluation of the Actions and Resources of the Competition Authorities

Resumé

In an increasing number of jurisdictions, public bodies are initiating projects to evaluate the effects of competition policy programs or to analyse the efficiency of competition agency organisation and procedures. Evaluation should be a routine ingredient of the competition agency’s annual agenda and should be incorporated into the formulation of budgets and operational plans. Over the past decade competition agencies have responded to their own awareness of the importance of ex post evaluation and external demands for performance measurement by devoting increasing attention to analysing the effectiveness of existing institutional arrangements and initiatives. Useful insights can be derived from a variety of evaluation methods, using resources within and external to the competition authority. One of the most fruitful areas of evaluation to date has been the field of merger control. Evaluations of existing institutional arrangements, including organisation, management methods and operational procedures, have proven useful in identifying areas for improvement and motivating adjustments. The organisation assessment and development framework shows promise as a means for competition authorities to improve the quality of their institutional arrangements. Considerable work remains to be done to refine the methodologies used to evaluate the effectiveness of completed competition policy. This document comprises proceedings in the original languages of a Roundtable on the Evaluation of the Actions and Resources of Competition Authorities which was held by the Competition Committee in June 2005.

Myndighed
OECD
Regel
Rapport
Udfald
Rapport