Over the past decade, it has become increasingly clear that some markets evolve into monop-oly-like structures, even without exhibiting all the typical characteristics of classic monopoly markets. This development is particularly evident in markets where digital platform services – such as online marketplaces, search engines, social media networks, web browsers, or operating systems – play a central role.

Markets that develop monopoly-like characteristics due to such demand-side forces are com-monly referred to as tipped markets. The term reflects the idea that these markets pass a tip-ping point at which one firm gains a decisive advantage and emerges as the market winner. This tipping point may be reached, for example, when a firm’s user base grows sufficiently large, or its data assets become sufficiently extensive, that competitors can no longer compete effectively. Once this point is reached, the market winner often enjoys a position of self-rein-forcing dominance.

While tipped markets, like classic monopolies, may not always be harmful to consumers or so-ciety, they do raise competition concerns that may warrant regulatory intervention. With tipped markets and classic monopolies alike, the key policy objectives are the same: to prevent abuse of dominance, preserve market contestability, promote innovation, and safeguard con-sumer welfare. However, the distinct structural characteristics of tipped markets – especially when compared to traditional monopolies – call for a tailored approach to competition assess-ment and enforcement.

This report explores the market factors that contribute to market tipping and proposes a framework for assessing whether a market has, in fact, tipped. It then applies this framework in five case studies, each examining the state of competition through the lens of the identified tipping characteristics.